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1 No two states in the modern era have so defied classical definitions of nationalism as
Pakistan and Israel. Created within a year of each other, in 1947 and 1948, respectively,
both emerged as products of imperial alliances designed to respond to the concerns of a
widely  dispersed  minority  population—Muslims  in  India  and  Jews  in  Europe.  What
distinguished their  claims to nationality was neither the historic  right  to a  common
territory nor membership in a blood-based community, but the fact of belonging to a
shared religion, defined as ‘Islam’ for Pakistan and ‘Judaism’ for Israel. Today the two
countries stand as the only examples of religious nationalism and, in doing so, appear to
thwart every post-Enlightenment expectation of nationhood as a quintessentially secular
project.
2 This paradox forms the subject of Faisal Devji’s elegantly argued treatise, which explores
the idea of Pakistan as an expression of Zionism, an ideology most commonly associated
with the creation of the country’s closest ideological twin—Israel.  Devji’s argument is
simple: in order to understand the enigma represented by Pakistan and Israel we must
cease to assume that either is a ‘nation’ in the conventional sense. Instead, Pakistan and
Israel represent political manifestations of an ideal form of the Enlightenment state that
harks back to an earlier moment in the Enlightenment when the coming together of
peoples was seen to rest on (the fantasy of) political consent, legitimized by the force of
an idea alone. In this sense, both countries stand apart from the trajectory of nineteenth-
century European nationalism, which judged the nation to be the hallmark of a collective
attachment born of shared blood and soil.
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3 Thus, even while Pakistan and Israel represented a new kind of politics shaped by the
collapse of the international order under the aegis of the League of Nations and its system
of  minority  protection  in  the  1920s,  both  were  in  fact  inspired  by  ‘old-fashioned
principles  and  ideas  regarding  a  social  contract’  that  looked  to  seventeenth-century
European thought (Devji 2013: 106). Predicated on the idea of collective belonging, this
version of the social contract had already found expression in the settler colonies of the
New World, in southern Africa and Liberia. Indeed these settler colonies, Devji argues,
constitute  the  real  historical  precursors  of  Pakistan  and  Israel.  However,  what
distinguished  Pakistan  and  Israel  from  these  earlier  state  forms  was  the  conscious
invocation of religion as the basis of their social contracts.
4 Herein lies a fresh contradiction. For just as Pakistan and Israel could not be regarded as
‘nations’,  where  blood  and soil  played  a  part,  the  ‘religion’  they  invoked bore  little
relation  to  ‘the  life  world  of  belief  and  practice’  (p. 5).  Religion  was  not  ‘some old-
fashioned theological entity, but an abstract and modern idea of belonging’ (p. 47). In the
case  of  Muslim nationalism,  religion,  namely,  Islam,  became  no  more  than  ‘another
aspect of the social contract […] and even an empty idea […] deployed to name only the
most general and disparate of qualities, like a theologically indeterminate belief in the
God of Muhammad’ (p. 47). This bold proposition appears to chime closely with a broad
swath of current scholarship on the discourse of ‘Islam’ in Pakistan.
5 In my own work I  have suggested that the political  articulation of  Islam in Pakistan
functioned as an abstraction largely to mask the lack of consensus over the terms of
‘Islam’  in public  life—a condition that  has  deepened uncertainty about  the country’s
national identity (Shaikh 2009). Others, such as the anthropologist, Katherine Ewing, have
also drawn attention to the idea of ‘Islam’ in Pakistan as ‘an empty container’  (or to
borrow a  phrase  from Slavoj  Zizek,  ‘an unspecified object  of  desire’),  whose  specific
contents had to remain hidden for fear of widening splits that divided the nation at birth
(Ewing 1997: 67). By contrast, the focus of Devji’s interest is neither Islam in Pakistan, nor
indeed Judaism in Israel, after independence. Instead he is concerned to highlight the
nationalist moment when religion as ‘the empty idea of a national will untrammelled by
anything  given  outside  the  idea  itself’  was  pregnant  with  radical  possibilities  (Devji
2013: 47). This is not to say that Devji is indifferent to the trajectory of ‘religion’ in the
unfolding of the social contract in Israel and Pakistan. As he observes, ‘religion’ as an idea
of belonging that holds the ‘nation’ together still endures in one important respect in the
life of these two independent states. For notwithstanding their statehood, both Israel and
Pakistan still  determine their nationality by reference neither to shared territory nor
common descent but by the question: ‘who is a Jew and who is a Muslim’ (p. 48).
6 But the real value of exploring the implications of such an open-ended conception of
‘religion’ lies in the opportunity it offers to Devji to produce some arresting insights into
the nature of Muslim nationalism in India. By far his most original assertion is the claim
that the nebulous idea of ‘Islam’ favoured by early Muslim nationalists owed much to the
outlook of prominent Shia Muslims, who gained influence in the All-India Muslim League
(the main Muslim nationalist organization) soon after its creation in 1906. Drawn from
the merchant and land-owning classes  of  western and northern India,  they included
luminaries  such  as  the  Aga  Khan,  head  of  the  Ismaili  Shia  community;  the  wealthy
industrialist, Adamjee Peerbhoy, and the feudal magnate, the Raja of Mahmudabad. All
worked  closely  with  Muhammad  Ali  Jinnah,  the  founder  of Pakistan  and  himself  a
member of one of the Bombay Shia Muslim (Khoja) communities, and all promoted what
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Devji calls a tradition of ‘Shia ecumenism’. Studiously oblivious to sectarian differences,
they sought the consolidation of a national Muslim ‘community’, whose contours were
almost as obscure as the ‘Islam’ with which it was associated. But the promotion of this
‘ecumenical Islam’, informed by esoteric Shia doctrines of dissimulation and the shielding
of private faith from public religion, reflected serious concerns that involved making
space for the Shia Muslim minority in colonial India who, Devji maintains, were almost as
wary of Sunni supremacy as of domination by the Hindu majority.
7 This argument signals a major departure from most accepted interpretations of Indian
Muslim nationalism and sheds light on developments of vital import in Pakistan. It does
so in three ways. First, it brings squarely into focus the Muslim merchant and trading
classes of western India, whose influence in shaping the contours of Muslim nationalism
has been largely overshadowed by the role of the north Indian Muslim gentry associated
with what Devji identifies as ‘the old politics of Aligarh’ (p. 63) dominated by Sir Syed
Ahmed Khan.  Second,  while the relationship between Shia thinking and the League’s
appeal  to  a  more  ecumenical  version  of  Islam would  need  to  be  more  conclusively
established,  Devji’s  premise  suggests  new ways  of  thinking  about  Muslim nationalist
politics as the site not only of ‘communal’ opposition between Hindus and Muslims but
also of incipient intra-Muslim sectarian tensions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
it serves as a powerful explanation of the sectarian violence that has steadily engulfed
Pakistan  since  the  creation  of  the  state.  The  marginalisation  of  the  country’s  Shia
minority and the conflation of Islam with the narrow sectarian discourse of Sunnism in
Pakistan today, as some others have also argued (Nasr 2000), stand as stark testimony to
the collapse of the ‘ecumenical religion’ that was most vigorously championed by the
League’s Shia Muslim leaders.
8 In one of his rare forays into Pakistan’s troubled present, Devji reflects on the demise of
‘ecumenical Islam’ in Pakistan and suggests that it must be seen as a collapse of the
efforts of early Muslim nationalists to reject the idea of Islam as an external religious
‘system’ in favour of consolidating it as ‘a new kind of public religion from the inside,
while reserving their own devotions to a private faith’ (Devji 2013: 221). It is important to
note  that,  by  and  large,  Devji  reserves  the  use  of  the  generic  term  ‘early  Muslim
nationalists’ not for the nineteenth-century politics of the North Indian Muslim gentry
associated  with  the  so-called  ‘Aligarh  school’,  but  rather  for  the  first  generation  of
leaders of the All-India Muslim League: while ‘the former pressured the government for
commercial  and aristocratic  causes  […]  the  organization of  princely  politics  and the
preservation of  noble inheritances,  the latter  were concerned with liberal  education,
professional vocations and reserved places in the civil service’ (p. 63). But the aspirations
of the League’s early leaders, such as the Aga Khan and Jinnah, who stood for an open-
ended view of Islam resting on the separation of private belief from public expressions of
membership in  the religious  community  as  a  core  part  of  their  mission,  were  to  be
wrecked  by  the  very  ‘logic  of  Muslim  nationalism’  (p. 247).  It  demanded  the
externalization of religion—a process that involved the destruction of every vestige of the
‘dark matter’ of ‘geographical, historical and demographic inheritance’, as well as the
inner life of the believer, and their substitution by a programme of ‘action’ that insisted
on ‘the  outward observance  of  Islam’  (p. 247)  as  an index of  political  loyalty  to  the
nationalist cause. Jinnah himself, Devji observes, came eventually to accept the ‘new kind
of system Islam represented’ (p. 225). He cites as an example Jinnah’s Eid day broadcast in
1939 in which Jinnah held Islam’s ‘particular significance’ to lie in its meaning as ‘action’
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(p. 225).  This  emphasis on external  observance  and action transformed Islam into  ‘a
national religion’ (p. 244) that was as fatal to Islam’s universalist enterprise as to the early
Muslim nationalist  promise of  a  secular  order  in Pakistan.  But  while  it  was  perhaps
inevitable  that  the  creation of  Pakistan would  lead to  the  destruction of  Islam as  a
universal idea—Devji describes Pakistan as the ‘grave of Islam as an ecumenical religion’
(p. 248)—arguably the greater paradox,  according to Devji,  is  that  today Islam’s  ‘true
home remains with the Muslim minority in India’  (p. 250).  Be that as it  may,  we are
indebted  to  Devji  for  offering  us  a  rare  glimpse  of  that  moment  (however  brief)  in
Pakistan’s nationalist history when the language of a more inclusive, universalist and
‘ecumenical’ Islam held real sway. The fact that those singled out by him as responsible
for projecting this vision of ‘ecumenical Islam’ were all  Shias does however raise the
question of whether Devji is also suggesting that Pakistan’s adoption of a consciously
Sunni profile over time, and the concomitant marginalization of its Shia minority, would
have doomed the ecumenical project anyway. He does not say so explicitly, but there is no
doubt that the great public dramas of blasphemy and accusations of desecration against
sectarian  rivals  in  Pakistan  today  are  a  tragic  extension  of  that  onward  march  to
‘externalize religion completely as a kind of citizenship without politics’ (p. 247)—or at
least the kind of politics whose universality was once seen to have rested on protecting
Islam as an abstract idea.
9 It is precisely the abstract idea of belonging to a common religion that animates Devji’s
understanding of Zionism as the bond linking the national narratives of Pakistan and
Israel. Nevertheless, a few clarifications are in order. While many readers will naturally
assume that the term ‘Zion’ in conjunction with Pakistan is intended to set the stage for a
comparison of Pakistan and Israel, this is not (nor does Devji pretend it is) an exercise in
comparative politics. There are, of course, some instructive parallels to be drawn: both
Israel and Pakistan represent the successful culmination of ‘minority’ politics; both were
cast as ‘homelands’ for their persecuted ‘people’; both emerged under the control of a
‘secular’ leadership that instrumentalized the language of religion to service its cause,
and both have  struggled  to  overcome existential  threats  in  a  hostile  neighbourhood
(Kumaraswamy 1997).
10 But exploring these similarities, compelling as they are, is clearly not the object of Devji’s
interest. Rather, his focus is on Pakistan (albeit restricted to its formative phase) with the
idea of Zion serving as a template to call attention to Pakistan as an exemplar of what he
believes is a distinct form of ‘political geography’ that is at once indifferent to territory
(holy or otherwise) and unresponsive to any claims of nationality as blood-based. In doing
so, Devji hopes to lay bare the central contradiction at the heart of Zion that haunts Israel
and  Pakistan:  ‘the  desire  to  both  join  and  reject  the  world  of  nation  states’  (Devji
2013: 11).  Its  manifestation in Pakistan lay in the creation of  a  state that  claimed to
embody a Muslim ‘nation’ even while it rejected the idea of (Indian) nationalism. In Israel
it found expression in the Jewish repudiation of European (majoritarian) nationalism,
which  resulted  in  a  state  stamped  with  a  version  of  the  very  ‘nationhood’  it  had
renounced. This ambiguity, Devji suggests, has been amplified by a concern to anchor
national claims in a supra-national agenda—in the case of Israel, the fate of world Jewry;
in the case of Pakistan, the future of pan-Islamism.
11 The  tensions  generated  by  these  ambiguities  are  treated  by  Devji  with  marvelous
subtlety. But he also makes an exceptional contribution by teasing out, in ways rarely
attempted  before,  comparisons  between the  global  perspectives  nurtured  by  Muslim
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nationalists in India and the projection of Zionism as a ‘world-historical’ phenomenon by
European Jewry in the context of a waning imperial landscape. Devji would not, of course,
be the first to explore the ambiguous relationship between the Muslim minority ‘crisis’ in
India and the Jewish minority ‘question’ in Europe. It has already received attention in
the ground-breaking work of Aamir Mufti (2007) and his attempt to frame the crisis of
Muslim identity in late colonial  India in the light of debates on the assimilation and
emancipation of the Jewish minority in post-Enlightenment Europe. Like Mufti, Devji is
engaged by the choices  made by Jewish and Muslim minority  intellectuals  forced to
confront the implications of a liberal-democratic order that presupposed rule by national
majorities. And like Mufti, Devji is also concerned to explore how both Muslims and Jews
in India and Europe, respectively, resisted not only their standing as a minority but also
their status as pariahs. But where Mufti fell somewhat short in demonstrating how and by
what means perceptions of the ‘Jewish question’ travelled or found their way into the
discourse  of  Indian  Muslim  intellectuals  in  late  colonial  India,  Devji  is  steadfast  in
pursuing the question.
12 The role of the Aga Khan—a key figure in the firmament of Muslim nationalist politics in
India  in the  1930s—appears  to  have  been  particularly  crucial.  Inspired  by  parallels
between Zionist demands for a homeland under Ottoman jurisdiction and ever insistent
calls for greater Muslim autonomy under British colonial rule in India, he found common
cause in their respective campaigns in spite of differences in scale involved in ‘settling’
the  claims  of  the  two minorities.  At  the  heart  of  the  Aga  Khan’s  vision  lays  a  new
pluralistic,  multi-national  and  multi-racial  order  that  was  indebted  to  an  imperial
landscape.  This vision shaped his understanding of  the Ottoman and British imperial
missions—a world he was persuaded would resolve, once and for all, ‘the problem with
numbers’ that militated against the interests of minorities (Devji 2013: 49-88). But what is
striking about the Aga Khan’s idiosyncratic conception of a new world order is not so
much its  endorsement  of  early  Zionism but  its  legacy  in  shaping  the  parameters  of
Muslim nationalist discourse in India. His plans for a South Asiatic Federation that would
re-organize India along lines of what Devji calls ‘a sub-imperial order of her own’ (p. 70),
was intended simultaneously to lift Muslims out of their status as a minority and, by so
doing, render ‘both categories, majority as well as minority, irrelevant in the vast and
plural sub-empire that India was meant to dominate’ (p. 74).
13 Nowhere did the gist of this idea find a louder echo than in the demand for ‘Hindu-
Muslim parity’  that  surfaced in opposition to  the Indian nationalist  narrative  in  the
decade leading up to the creation of Pakistan. Deployed by Jinnah as a weapon against the
perceived  ‘majoritarian’  bias  of  the  nationalist  programme  favoured  by  the  Indian
National Congress, the concept of Hindu-Muslim parity aimed at nothing less than to
render the logic of numbers invoked by the nation-state irrelevant. With hindsight it now
appears as a neat extension of the Aga Khan’s vision of a post-imperial order in which
(minority) Muslims could legitimately claim the same status as (majority) Hindus without
necessarily  requiring a  ‘national  state’  of  their  own—a view,  it  is  worth noting,  that
continues to resonate today among some Pakistani historians who argue that ‘Jinnah’s
Pakistan’  did not necessarily entail  the Partition of  India or a separate Muslim state
(Jalal 1985). Whatever the merits of this view (and Devji is circumspect about them), it
underscores the essential contradiction of Zionist nationalism, which not only rejected
any intrinsic link between the nation and the state but which also envisioned relegating
the nation-state to ‘a mere relic of tradition’ (Devji 2013: 79).
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14 As revealing as these insights are, the comparison between the minority nationalisms of
Pakistan and Israel poses some analytical problems. The most important of these pertains
to the soundness of drawing parallels between the fundamentally different ‘settlements’
to resolve the Jewish and Muslim ‘problems’ in Europe and India, respectively. This is not
so much to invoke claims of Jewish exceptionalism as to raise well-founded doubts about
comparing  a  ‘settlement’  necessitated  by  the  systematic  ethnic  genocide  of  Jews  in
Europe with one resulting from protracted constitutional negotiations involving Muslim
leaders in colonial India, even if the breakdown of those negotiations did eventually lead
to the violent uprooting of millions of people.
15 Another  problem  arises  from  the  failure  to  adequately  distinguish  between  the
nationalist impulses of a historically disempowered minority (European Jews) with those
of a once dominant minority (Indian Muslims). For it would seem reasonable to assume
that, whereas for European Jews the escape from minority status to statehood offered an
escape from centuries of actual discrimination and persecution, Muslim minority politics
in colonial India, as I have argued elsewhere (Shaikh 1989), was intimately tied both to
the experience of the loss of Muslim power in India and to deep-rooted assumptions
about the management of power as a Muslim prerogative.
16 Other questions of doubtful comparison also present themselves. While it is true that
Muslim  nationalism  was  inspired  neither  by  claims  to  ancestral  Muslim  lands  nor
reference  to  common biological  descent,  both  were  indisputably  key  features  in  the
construction of Jewish nationalism. It is hard to ignore the significance of the Zionist
connection to the territory of Israel or the prime importance given to the idea of a ‘Jewish
people’, who are presumed to have descended from common biological stock. Although
revisionist historians;  such as Shlomo Sand, have in recent years strongly challenged
what they call the ‘mythistory’ of a ‘Jewish people’ (Sand 2009) with a common ethnic
lineage  and  an  inalienable  ‘right  of  return’  to  the  ‘land  of  Israel’  (Sand 2012),  the
contestation aroused by this  debate rarely figures in Devji’s  analysis  of  Zionism as a
‘national’ construction. Indeed, the vital difference between Israel and Pakistan on the
issue of the ‘right of return’ (or its Hebrew equivalent, aliyah) and its central place in
Zionist thinking receives little or no attention. This oversight raises further questions
about drawing parallels between two states with putative Zionist identities in which one
would expressly endorse the claim of every member of world Jewry to claim citizenship of
the state of Israel while the other would deny (as it does) to Muslims in India, to say
nothing of the global Muslim diaspora, any such prospect in the state of Pakistan.
17 A subsidiary concern pertains to Devji’s discussion of the role of Dalit politics in defining
the Zionist contours of Pakistan, which appears as something of an outlier (Devji 2013:
163-200). This is not to say that Muslim nationalism in British India did not galvanise Dalit
politics, as is made abundantly clear by Devji in his analysis of the close if convoluted
relationship between the Dalit leader, B.R. Ambedkar and Jinnah. Rather, it is to question
whether the identity politics of caste, such as outlined here, helps furnish the tools to
refine our understanding of  Muslim nationalism as an expression of  Zionism. This is
certainly debatable when set against the idea of Jewish Zionism and its emphasis on a
‘Jewish people’ of common biological origin with an alienable right to the land of Israel
although less so perhaps in the Devjian sense of Zionism as a ‘political form in which
nationality is defined by the rejection of an old land for a new, thus attenuating the
historical role that blood and soil play in the language of Old World nationalism’ (p. 3).
For there are of course, as Devji observes, some symbolic parallels between the condition
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of ‘Untouchability’ attached to Dalits and the status of the pariah ascribed to Jews in
Europe although less so (I would contend) to Muslims in British India. Nevertheless, there
remains  the  risk  of  over-working  these  parallels  and  obscuring  in  the  process  the
significance of Dalit politics as arguably no more than a field of opportunity for Muslim
nationalists to press their case.
18 These reservations are not intended to diminish either the vigour or the originality of
Devji’s thinking on the Zionist roots of Muslim nationalism, where the idea of belonging
(in this case to a shared religion) took precedence over any role attributed to blood and
soil as the basis of nationhood.
19 Nowhere is this argument more finely tuned than in Devji’s discussion of the demand for
Pakistan and its rejection of history and territory as defining features of the nation. It was
Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Indian National Congress and a staunch opponent of the
Muslim nationalist agenda, who famously declared that in order for Muslims in India to
claim nationhood they had first  to  reject  the  historical  past  they shared with other
communities  in  India.  But  Nehru’s  understanding  of  a  shared  historical  past  as
fundamental to the making of a nation was diametrically at odds with Muslim nationalist
assumptions.  For  the  poet  and  thinker,  Muhammad  Iqbal,  who  is  today  revered  in
Pakistan as  the  high priest  of  Muslim nationalism,  the  past  had nothing to  do with
‘national  history’  conceived  of  in  the  Nehruvian  sense  as  an  interactive,  let  alone
‘syncretic’, process unfolding over time. (Shaikh 2005: 377). On the contrary, the past for
Iqbal could only be understood as ‘universal history’, evocative of Islam as a universal
idea that transcended serial time associated with ‘national history’.  So-called ‘Muslim
territories’, which were eventually designated as Pakistan, also carried no meaning for
Iqbal as ‘national’ territories: ‘these lands, together with their inhabitants’ constituted for
him  ‘nothing  more  than  instances  of  Islam  as  a  form of  the  universal  idea’  (Devji
2013: 119). While this ‘world-historical perspective’ of Indian Muslims favoured by Iqbal
may have been neatly tailored to contest the position of Indian Muslims as a minority,
Devji makes a persuasive case in suggesting that it also pointed to a new kind of ‘national’
politics that ‘diverged significantly from any vision retailed by Congress’ (p. 118) through
its  global  reach  and  international  orientation.  What  emerges  from  this  is  a  fresh
understanding of Pakistan as an idea that transcended the limits of the colonial state to
play out on a larger international stage—another example, one might say, of the Zionist
paradox that would internationalise the nation.
20 But there was here also a complex dynamic at work that was more suggestive of Muslim
nationalist  ambivalence  rather  than  the  outright  rejection  of  a  shared,  potentially
‘national’, past with other communities in India. This ambivalence was particularly on
show  in  attempts  by  Muslim  nationalists  to  highlight  their  contribution  to  the
development of a composite Indian culture while simultaneously justifying the creation
of  a  separate  Muslim  ‘nation’  by  blaming  their  Hindu  counterparts  for  willfully
destroying  communal  co-existence.  Devji  shows  how  this  curious  ‘denial  of  Muslim
responsibility  for  their  own nationalism’  (p. 93)  resonated in  the thinking of  leading
stalwarts of the League, including the eminent nationalist historian, I.H. Qureshi and the
senior Muslim politician, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, one of Jinnah’s closest allies. While
Devji makes no reference to it, it is worth noting that much of this ambivalence persists
in Pakistan, where some historians1 and sections of liberal public opinion2 are at pains to
demonstrate  that  Pakistan  was  a  tragic  accident that  could  have  been  avoided  had
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Jinnah’s  proposals  for  an  honourable  settlement  not  been  obstructed  by  Nehru’s
arrogance and the divisive agenda of his Hindu nationalist peers in Congress.
21 Jinnah himself was, of course, deeply ambivalent (if not hostile) to the idea of a shared
historical past. His many speeches and statements serve as ample proof that it was not so
much  the  discourse  of  history,  but  the  language  of law  that  animated  his  politics.
Obsessed with upholding abstract principles that were by definition unhistorical, Jinnah
laboured hard ‘to lift the language of Indian politics out of the swamp of history’ (p. 100).
This, Devji argues, was consistent with Jinnah’s idea of ‘nationality’ as no more than a
legal and constitutional category that was divorced from history, fixated on the present
and oriented to the future. The Muslim ‘nation’ then had ‘no positive content of its own’
(p. 105), representing for Jinnah merely an index of belonging designed to facilitate a new
social contract between equals in which neither numbers nor claims to territory would
play a part…
22 Here again is  a powerful  re-statement of  Devji’s  larger argument about Zionism as a
distinct form of national politics that is at once old-fashioned in its invocation of a social
contract that predates the age of nationalism and forward-looking in its vision of a world
detached from history. But it also has a bearing on our understanding of Indian Muslim
nationalism as  a  new kind of  ‘national’  politics,  where the primacy accorded to ‘the
principle  of  parity  in  contract’  obviated  the  need  for  the  ‘nation’  to  ‘exist  in  any
substantive sense as a sovereign polity’ (p. 106). As such it offers a compelling explanation
of  the  conundrum  that  has  long  plagued  historians  of  Partition:  namely,  Jinnah’s
extraordinary decision to accept Britain’s Cabinet Mission Plan for India in 1946, which
denied sovereign Muslim nationhood and proposed instead a loose Indian federation that
categorically endorsed the principle of Hindu-Muslim parity.
23 But is Devji here proposing merely another version of the claim that Jinnah’s Pakistan
was nothing but a bargaining ploy ever amenable to negotiation? It would seem not. For
what made Jinnah’s Pakistan ‘negotiable’ was not some calculated interest with open-
ended goals, but a specific understanding of the nation as the outcome of an act of pure
volition devoid of inherited history or attachment to land and lineage. Devji sets this bold
claim against his understanding of ‘Enlightenment politics’, which he illustrates by way of
Voltaire’s tragedy, Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet le Prophète (1736), set in Mecca on the eve of
the Islamic conquest. It juxtaposes the ‘revolutionary’ and ‘fanatical’ ‘politics of reason’
represented  by  Islam  and  its  Prophet,  Mahomet  (Muhammad),  against  the  web  of
inherited customs and traditions defended by the elderly Meccan leader, Zopire. Devji’s
aim here is to draw a parallel between ‘the purely abstract universality of the idea’ (Devji
2013: 133) as conveyed by the Enlightenment ‘politics of reason’ and Jinnah’s own ‘politics
of principle’, which Devji suggests was more immediately inspired by John Morley’s Essay
on Compromise—a book concerned with upholding principles that Jinnah is on record as
recommending to his followers to read ‘not only once but over and over again’ (p. 140). It
was this insistence on principle, Devji argues, that served as fuel to promote Jinnah’s
abstract idea of the nation as a concept divorced from the particularities of geography
and the legacies of history. At the same time, it would be hard to ignore the constraints
imposed  on  Jinnah’s  vision  by  the  contextual  realities  arising  from  the  uneven
demographic  distribution  of  Muslims  across  different  regions  in  India  with  vastly
different  cultural  traditions.  These  circumstances  precluding  any  idea  of  the  nation
couched in the language of  territorial  and historical  integrity also favoured an anti-
territorial view of the Muslim nation and national sovereignty. They, no less than matters
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of principle, led Jinnah to invoke the Muslim nation in abstract terms as a ‘constitutional
category’ (p. 105). But their adoption also produced a certain distorted logic. As Tahir
Hasnain Naqvi (2010: 74) has shown, it allowed Jinnah to hail the ‘exemplary sacrifices’ of
Muslims in the Hindu-majority states to the cause of Pakistan even while advising them
to ‘stick to their respective homelands’ and live as Indian citizens. And while berating the
‘state  of  slumber’  that  afflicted Muslims  in  Muslim-majority  areas,  he  was  forced to
endorse their claim to be recognised as the undisputed citizens of the territorial state of
Pakistan. It was this nationalist narrative still  struggling to reconcile the language of
territorial belonging with exclusion that, Naqvi argues, ‘made it possible for Jinnah to
assert  without a  sense  of  contradiction  that  he  had  ‘created’  Pakistan  for  the  very
Muslims he expected to ‘stick’ to India.’
24 In a sustained and moving digression on Jinnah’s ‘politics of negation’, Devji looks for its
sources in the ‘fanatical’ politics of the Enlightenment, where abstract logic was used to
destroy everything represented in nature and history. This ‘demonic’ force, Devji argues,
was imbibed by Jinnah and found lyrical expression in the poetry of Iqbal.  While the
former relied on it to sustain the negative conduct of his politics, the latter invoked it to
voice his admiration of Satan’s defiant rejection of paradise. Both aimed to capture the
spirit of a ‘free-floating and self-possessed nation that rejected its grounding in nature or
history’ (Devji 2013: 148). In doing so, both projected a vision that was as radical and
fantastical in its politics as any revolutionary ideal heralding the onset of a new era—a
Year One—purged of the past and its memory.
25 Devji’s  determined  pursuit  of  this  vision  and  its  meaning  for  Pakistan  today  is  an
astonishing  achievement  even  if  the  complexity  of  his  argument  might  leave  some
readers feeling unduly unchallenged. Not for him the minutiae of what Sunil Khilnani has
mocked as  the 'pointillism'  of  subaltern historians (Khilnani  1997: 3)  nor the tangled
thicket of interests and intentionality beloved of the so-called Cambridge School of Indian
History. Instead what Devji offers us is a breath-taking vista—a vista as much of the past
as the future of Pakistan. While his approach with its pointed emphasis on the broad
‘forms of  argumentation and lines  of  reasoning’  (Devji  2013: 9)  that  inspired Muslim
nationalism will sit uncomfortably with more instrumental interpretations of Pakistan
that regard it as the product of a confluence of interests, Devji goes beyond this limited
debate by arguing, rightly, that what sets ideas apart from ‘transient’ interests is their
power to ‘[live] beyond the political conjunctures within which they were produced to
shape new futures’  (p. 8).  And it  is  precisely this keen eye to the future of  Pakistan
combined with a profound consciousness of the ambiguity of its nationalist past that
makes Devji one of the finest chroniclers of this troubled country.
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NOTES
1. Reiterating  Jinnah’s  desire  to  avert  the  partition  of  India  and  surrender  his  demand  for
Pakistan in exchange for what he judged as a fair constitutional settlement under the Cabinet
Mission Plan of 1946, which provided for a loose federation of provinces rather than the creation
of a sovereign Muslim state,  the historian,  Ayesha Jalal  (2014: 36-38),  observes:  ‘This was the
second time in two years that Jinnah had turned down the offer of ‘Pakistan’ […] But Congress
had no intention of  honouring [the  Plan]  […]  Nehru effectively  negating Congress’s  [earlier]
acceptance… Congress’s change of heart required abandoning two of its oldest and most sacred
principles—the unity of India and full independence. But the advantages of the compromise far
outweighed  the  disadvantages  […]  Moreover  by  cutting  its  losses  and  effectively  demanding
partition, Congress could rid itself of Jinnah and the League and settle down to ruling three-
fourths of India according to its unfettered will’.
2. A recent article published in the Daily Times (Lahore) also drew attention to the unintended
consequences  forced  on  Jinnah  by  an  intransigent  Congress  unwilling  to  negotiate  a  fair
constitutional settlement between Hindus and Muslims. Its author states ‘The fact is that Jinnah
despite not having gotten quite what he wanted, i.e. a confederation of two federations within a
United India,  seemed quite happy with the federal  solution laid down by the Plan.  […] [But]
Congress sought to wreck the Plan [and] had already made up its mind […] This promoted (sic)
Jinnah to tell  Kuldip Nayyar [the veteran Indian journalist]  ‘Young man, don’t  blame me for
partition, it is Nehru who is responsible for this’ (Latif Hamdani 2012).
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